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1 Introduction 
Regulation of economic externalities may induce significant technological 
innovations. In the longer run, the cumulative effect of such research and development (R&D) 
may dwarf the short-run gains from cost-effective regulation. Furthermore, it may expand the 
opportunity set of the regulatory policy itself.1 As such, it is not surprising that the literature 
on R&D and firms’ incentives to invest in advanced technology is vast.2 
However, as pointed out by Krysiak (2008), one aspect of this literature is somewhat 
surprising: these studies tend to analyze how much is invested, but do not consider the kind of 
technology that is implemented. This constitutes a shortcoming of the literature. For example, 
emissions reductions of SOx and NOx may be achieved either by installing scrubbers3 or by 
relying on fuel substitution to, e.g., low-sulfur coal. Similarly, emissions of CO2 may be 
reduced by, e.g., a switch from coal to gas or carbon capture and storage (CCS). How this 
choice is affected by the environmental policy regime is arguably an important consideration 
in evaluation of public policy. Furthermore, firms’ technology choice will affect the demand 
for technology and, thereby, the direction of R&D effort (see, e.g., Griliches, 1957 or Ruttan, 
2001). 
This paper inquires whether environmental regulation has a risk-related technology 
choice effect in addition to the well-known effects on cost efficiency and investment levels.4 
We consider two types of regulation: tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax. These 
are presently by far the most important occurrences where both price- and quantity-based 
regulatory approaches are suitable. Under tradable emissions permits, the government sets a 
cap on aggregate emissions, and the issued licenses to emit (permits) are tradable among 
firms. Prominent examples of such schemes are found in the EU emissions trading scheme 
(EU ETS), the US SO2 trading program and various regulatory schemes for NOx emissions in 
the US.5 Price-based approaches like harmonized prices, fees, or taxes as a method of 
coordinating environmental policies among countries currently have no international 
                                                     
1
 See for instance Kneese and Schultze (1975) or Orr (1976) for an early presentation of this view. Jaffe and 
Stavins (1995) offer an empirical approach. 
2
 For a thorough discussion on the literature on environmental policy and R&D we refer to Jaffe et al. (2002), 
Löschel (2002), or Requate (2005a). 
3
 That is, e.g., post-combustion flue-gas desulfurization and selective catalytic reduction, respectively. 
4
 For the latter, see for instance Denicolo (1999) and Requate and Unold (2003). 
5
 See EU (2003, 2005, 2009) or Convery and Redmond (2007) for more on the EU ETS. Joskow et al. (1998) 
offer a brief but informative account of the US SO2 trading program. The NOx program features the Regional 
Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), NOx Budget Program, 
and the NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP). For details, see Burtraw et al. (2005). 
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experience (Nordhaus, 2007). However, emissions taxes have considerable national 
experience. Two examples are the US tax on ozone-depleting chemicals and the Norwegian 
NOx tax. 
We utilize that firms’ choices of abatement technology depends on the extent of 
anticipated fluctuations in the abatement level. This relationship was recognized early by 
Stigler (1939) and Hart (1940) (applied to the production of a good). Following Stigler 
(1939), and later extended by Marschak and Nelson (1962), we refer to the firms’ ability to 
change abatement levels in response to new information as their “flexibility”. That is, the 
better equipped a firm is to respond to new information, the more flexible is its abatement 
technology. As argued by Stigler (1939), flexibility is not a free good: a plant specially 
designed to work at a given production level q will produce this quantum cheaper than a plant 
built to be passably efficient between q/2 and 2q. Accepting this argument, we get a trade-off 
between efficient output at minimum average cost and flexibility. This paper models this 
trade-off by assuming that minimum average abatement costs and the slope of the marginal 
abatement cost curve vary inversely with flexibility (see Figure 1). This is in agreement with 
Stigler (1939), Marschak and Nelson (1962) and Mills (1984).6 
This paper introduces two sources of uncertainty: an exogenously given stochastic 
product price (e.g., because of demand uncertainty) and uncertain firm-specific abatement 
costs. In the first part of this paper (Subsection 2.1), we examine the first- and second-order 
moments in the probability distributions of optimal abatement and optimal production under 
tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax. Our results indicate that the above-
mentioned uncertainties affect the firms differently under the two environmental policy 
regimes. In particular, the two regulatory instruments will, in general, lead to different 
expected aggregate production levels, given that regulation is designed to induce equal 
expected aggregate emissions, and abatement technology choice is endogenous. Furthermore, 
the variances in firms’ optimal production and abatement levels may be larger under either 
regulatory regime. The key determinants of this ambiguity are the covariance between the 
permit price and the firm-specific stochastic abatement costs, and the variance in the product 
price.
 
As such, the ranking of the variances depends on the specification of the stochastic 
elements. 
                                                     
6
 The discussion of flexibility in Stigler (1939) is not formal, but Marschak and Nelson (1962) argue 
persuasively that Stigler’s notion of flexibility satisfies this criterion. 
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In the second part of the paper (Subsection 2.2), we use the derived first- and second-
order moments to examine the technology choice of the forward-looking firms. We find that 
tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax in general lead to implementation of different 
technologies. A tax encourages the most flexibility if and only if abatement costs and the 
equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the 
variance in the price of the good produced. Otherwise, tradable emissions permits induce the 
most flexible technology. The argument behind our result is straightforward. Firstly, we 
establish in Subsection 2.1 that both types of regulation may induce a larger variance in each 
firm’s abatement levels, depending on the above-mentioned stochastic variables. Secondly, 
we show in Subsection 2.2 that firms implement a more flexible abatement technology if the 
variance in abatement is inflated and vice versa. Therefore, the firms may choose the most 
flexible abatement technology under either regulatory regime. Subsection 2.3 provides a brief 
extension, allowing for heterogeneous risk across firms. Section 3 concludes. 
Technology choice is examined by the literature on price-induced innovation. Among 
these, Morton and Schwartz (1968) show that optimal technology choice depends on the 
initial technology, the relative factor prices and the relative costs of acquiring different types 
of innovations. Magat (1978) introduces regulation and finds that effluent taxes and effluent 
standards lead to a distinctively different allocation of R&D funds between improvements in 
abatement technology and production technology. Kon (1983) looks at the role of output price 
uncertainty and shows that it can lead to investment in more labor-intensive technologies. 
Mills (1984) shows that an unregulated competitive firm will invest more in flexibility if 
demand uncertainty increases. Lund (1994) allows R&D growth to take more than one 
direction, and shows that this may create the need for interplay between R&D subsidies and a 
carbon tax. Zhao (2003) finds that abatement cost uncertainties reduce firms’ investment 
incentive under both tradable emissions permits and emission taxes if the investment is 
irreversible, and more so under taxes. Kaboski (2005) shows that relative input price 
uncertainty can cause investment inaction as the firms wait to get more information about 
what type of technology is most profitable to implement. Fowlie (2010) examines the US NOx 
Budget Program and finds that deregulated plants were less likely to implement more capital 
intensive environmental compliance options compared with regulated or publicly owned 
plants. Furthermore, the literature on implications of uncertainty on optimal choice of policy 
instruments (without technology investment) is extensive. In a seminal article, Weitzman 
(1974) shows that a higher ratio of the slope of marginal damages relative to the slope of 
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marginal abatement costs favors quotas. Hoel and Karp (2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003) 
extend this result to stock pollutants with additive uncertainty.7 They also find that an increase 
in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage, and obtain numerical results that 
suggest that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gases. Hoel and Karp (2001) 
examine the case with stock pollutants and multiplicative uncertainty. Their analytical results 
are ambiguous, but, using a numerical model, they find that taxes dominate quotas for a wide 
range of parameter values under both additive and multiplicative uncertainty in the case of 
climate change mitigation policies. Stavins (1996) shows that positive correlation between 
marginal costs and marginal benefits works in favor of quantity-based instruments with flow 
pollutants. Hybrid policies that combine price- and quantity-based policies have been 
examined by, e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978), Pizer (2002) and Jacoby 
and Ellerman (2004). These studies suggest that hybrid policies generally dominate a single 
instrument approach. 
Finally, this paper is related closely to Krysiak (2008), who finds that price-based 
regulation leads to implementation of a more flexible technology than tradable emissions 
permits.8 This differs from our finding that either regulatory regime may induce most 
flexibility. The difference stems from different underlying assumptions, as will be clear in the 
subsequent analysis. Most importantly, this paper departs from Krysiak (2008) by introducing 
a product market with a fluctuating price for the good whose production causes emissions 
subject to regulation as a byproduct. 
 
2 Theoretical analysis 
Consider a sector featuring n risk-neutral firms that supply a homogeneous good q to 
the world market. One unit of production causes one unit of emissions that is subject to either 
an emissions tax or tradable emissions permits regulation. This could, for example, be a 
country (or group of countries like the EU) that mitigates carbon emissions in order to meet 
its Kyoto requirements. We assume that the area covered by regulation constitutes a 
sufficiently small part of the world market to leave the price of the good produced 
                                                     
7
 Additive and multiplicative uncertainty applies to the intercept and the slope of marginal abatement costs, respectively. 
8
 The focus in Krysiak (2008) is not flexibility per se. Rather, he finds that the most flexible technology 
(interpreted as a smaller slope of the marginal cost function that does not necessarily entail a higher minimum 
average cost) is socially suboptimal because it increases the variation in production of the public good. This 
reduces utility as evaluated by a concave welfare function, by Jensen’s inequality. The reasons for the more 
modest conclusions in this paper are given in the conclusions. Moreover, the use of a concave utility function 
may be questionable because of this paper’s relevance for a stock pollutant such as CO2. 
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exogenous.9 Moreover, we assume divisibility between the costs of abatement and other 
production costs. This is reasonable in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology like, e.g., 
carbon capture and storage. In order to focus on the abatement technology choice, we let the 
cost of producing the good (without abatement) be given by 2/2iq  for all firms 
{ }nNi ,...,2,1=∈ . Finally, perfect competition is assumed in all markets.10 
Let all firms share the same menu of possible abatement cost structures. Except for the 
extension of Subsection 2.3, they also face the same uncertainty. Thus, firms choose equal 
abatement technologies (because they are identical). We omit the firm-specific subscript i 
except where necessary (i.e., on variables that differ across firms) to streamline notation. The 
firms’ choice of technology is governed by the flexibility parameter [ ]HL ΓΓ∈ ,γ , with 
flexibility increasing in γ. Any firm Ni ∈  may choose its technology (γ) from the following 
continuum of cost curves: 
( ) ( ) ,
2
)(,
2
γ
ηγγγ iiiii
a
aFac +++=  (1) 
where ai is firm i’s abatement and the fixed-cost component satisfies 0, >γγγ FF  for all γ. The 
loss of generality incurred by assuming a quadratic cost function is modest, because our main 
result states that either regulatory regime may induce the most flexible technology. As stated 
in the introduction, our choice of modeling involves the slope of the marginal abatement cost 
curve decreasing with the degree of flexibility, and minimum average abatement cost 
increasing with the degree of flexibility. In this respect, we observe that marginal expected 
abatement cost decreases in iH a<Γ≤γ .11 Moreover, it can be shown that expected 
minimum average cost increases in γ (see the Appendix). We add iiaη  to firm i’s abatement 
cost, with ),0(~ 2ησηi  being a firm-specific stochastic variable.12 For example, this reflects 
fluctuations in factor prices or factor productivity, or a breakdown of abatement equipment. 
                                                     
9
 An alternate simplifying assumption is a perfectly inelastic demand for the good produced. This assumption is 
made by, e.g., Mills (1984) and Sheshinski and Drèze (1976) in their study of competitive equilibrium with 
fluctuating demand. Krysiak (2008) points out that interpretation of the public good as emissions abatement in 
his analysis requires that the demand for the private good produced is highly inelastic. Excepting part (i) of 
Proposition 1, it can be shown that the qualitative results stated in Propositions 1 to 3 in the present paper 
remain valid under this alternate assumption. 
10
 Results by Joskow et al. (1998) and Convery and Redmond (2007) indicate, respectively, that the US market 
for sulfur dioxide emissions and the EU emissions trading scheme are competitive. 
11
 Even though a is stochastic, it is simple to define the model parameters such that this inequality holds. 
12
 As usual, ),0(~ 2ηση i  means that ηi is randomly distributed with expected value 0 and variance 2ησ . 
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As argued by Weitzman (1974), the determination of ηi could involve elements of genuine 
randomness, but might also stem from lack of information. The abatement cost shock ηi 
enters our functional form linearly, which is similar to, e.g., Hoel and Karp (2002), Karp and 
Zhang (2006), and Krysiak (2008). 
The model is organized in three periods. First, in period 1, the regulator sets the 
emissions tax or a binding cap on aggregate emissions. This is done in such a way that 
expected aggregate emissions are equal under the two regulatory instruments. Our assumption 
on timing and regulation is sometimes referred to as interim regulation in the literature (see, 
e.g., Requate (2005b)). The firms react to the regulation and invest in abatement technology 
in period 2. Finally, the firms choose their abatement and production levels in period 3. We 
assume that the outcomes of the stochastic variables are determined between periods 2 and 3. 
That is, decisions in periods 1 and 2 are made under uncertainty, while firms have full 
information in period 3. The firms’ production and abatement decisions in period 3 are made 
contingent on the firms’ abatement technology decisions in period 2. As such, the firms’ 
investment decisions are formulated as a two-stage game: the payoffs in period 3 determine 
the technology investment decisions in period 2. The model is solved backwards and our 
equilibrium concept is that of a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
2.1 Period 3: The production and abatement decisions 
Let the exogenously given price on good q be given by ε+D , where ),0(~ 2εσε  and 
D is an exogenous constant. It is natural to interpret ε as driven by stochastic fluctuations in 
demand, or supply shocks to firms that produce q but are not covered by the emissions trading 
scheme.13 We assume that the product price shock ε and the abatement cost shock ηi are 
independently distributed random variables, i.e., the expected value 0)( =iE εη  for all Ni ∈ . 
Let p refer to the price of permits and τ denote the emissions tax. The profit function in period 
3 of any firm Ni ∈  is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
2
1
2
1
max 22
,



−+−−−−−+= iiiiiii
aqi
aaFwaqqqD
ii γ
ηγγεπ  (2) 
                                                     
13
 Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) examine emissions permits and assume that risk may originate from two 
sources: the number of firms and production of the pollutant prior to abatement. 
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with { }τ,pw∈  and [ ]ii qa ,0∈ .14 Both the permit price p and the emissions tax τ remain to be 
determined. Remember that firms have full information in period 3 (i.e., the outcomes of the 
random variables ηi and ε are known) and that the shape on the firms’ abatement cost 
functions was determined by the firms’ technology choice γ in period 2. Because technology 
may differ across the regulatory regimes, we have { }tradtax γγγ ,∈ .15 We get the following 
first-order conditions for any firm Ni ∈ : 
,wDqqi −+== ε  (3) 
( ) ,γηγ ii wa −−=  (4) 
under the assumptions of interior solutions for production qi and abatement ai. We also 
observe that the second-order condition of the maximization problem (2) is fulfilled. Note that 
each firm’s production and abatement levels are random variables before the outcomes of the 
stochastic events are known (i.e., in periods 1 and 2). We now examine tradable emissions 
permits in Subsection 2.1.1, while Subsection 2.1.2 focuses on the emissions tax. Finally, we 
compare the regimes in Subsection 2.1.3. 
 
2.1.1 Tradable emissions permits 
The regulator sets a binding cap on aggregate emissions denoted S under tradable 
quantity regulation. The emissions trading market-clearing condition then becomes 
(remember that one unit of production causes one unit of emissions): 
,
,
∈
−=
Ni
traditrad anqS  (5) 
where tradq  and tradia ,  refer to the optimal levels of production and abatement under tradable 
emissions permits, respectively. We see that aggregate abatement depends on aggregate 
production and, therefore, by equation (3), on the product price shock ε. This is no surprise. 
Fluctuations in emissions, e.g., because of stochastic demand for the good produced, must be 
mirrored in a one-to-one relationship by aggregate abatement when there is a binding cap on 
aggregate emissions. From equations (3), (4) and (5) we get the following market-clearing 
permit price: 
                                                     
14
 The fixed cost F(γ) may alternatively be paid in period 2. This has no consequence for our results. 
15
 As a notational convention we let the subscripts “trad” and “tax” refer to tradable emissions permits and an 
emissions tax, respectively. 
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.
1
1
1



 


++−+
+
= 
∈Ni
traditrad
trad nn
SDp γηγε
γ
 
(6) 
The equation shows that the equilibrium permit price increases in the stochastic shocks to 
abatement costs ηi and the stochastic shocks to the product price ε. Inserting the above 
solution for the permit price p into the first-order conditions (3) and (4), we get the following 
solutions for the production and abatement of any firm Ni ∈ : 
,
1
1 



−−++
+
= 
∈Ni
itrad
tradtrad
trad
trad
nn
SDq ηγ
γ
ε
γ
γ
 
(7) 
.
1, tradiNj
j
trad
trad
trad
trad
tradi
nn
SDa γηηγγε
γ
γ
−



+−−+
+
= 
∈
 
(8) 
Not surprisingly, equation (7) shows that production increases in the stochastic shock to the 
product price ε. Moreover, the production of any firm Ni ∈  decreases in the stochastic 
shocks to the abatement cost ηi of all the ni ,...,2,1=  firms. This occurs because the total cost 
of production depends on the permit price, which is strictly increasing in abatement costs (cf. 
equation 6).16 Regarding abatement, we see from equation (8) that firm i’s abatement 
decreases in the stochastic shock to firm i’s abatement costs ηi. Furthermore, a positive shock 
to the product price ε increases the abatement of the firms. The reason is that there is a 
binding cap on aggregate emissions and 0>ε  increases production (cf. equation 7). Finally, 
we note that firm i’s abatement increases in the stochastic shocks to the abatement costs of 
any other firm 
'jη  with {}iNj \'∈ , because of a higher equilibrium permit price (cf. equation 
6). 
Equations (7) and (8) yield the equilibrium emissions traditrad aq ,−  
)( 1  ∈−+= Nj jnitradnS ηηγ  for any firm Ni ∈ . Naturally, aggregate emissions are equal to the 
binding emissions cap S under tradable emissions permits. 
From equations (7) and (8) we get the following expected values of the firms’ optimal 
production and abatement levels under tradable emissions permits: 
( ) ,
1 



−+
+
= trad
tradtrad
trad
trad
n
SDqE γ
γγ
γ
 
(9) 
                                                     
16
 The term “total cost of production” refers to the negative of the last five terms in equation (2). 
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( ) ,
1



−−
+
= trad
trad
trad
trad
n
SDaE γ
γ
γ
 
(10) 
which are equal across all firms Ni ∈ . We also observe that each firm’s expected emissions 
are given by nS / , which is simply total emissions (as given by the emissions cap S) divided 
by the number of firms n. 
Following Krysiak (2008), we define the correlation coefficient 2/)( ησηηρ jiE=  for 
all firms Nji ∈,  ( ji ≠ ). Do such symmetrically correlated variables imply any restrictions 
on the correlation coefficient ρ?17 We state the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. Let the correlation coefficient be given by 2/)( ησηηρ jiE=  for all firms Nji ∈,  
( ji ≠ ). Then we have [ ]1),1/(1 −−∈ nρ . 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Note in particular that the lower bound on the correlation coefficient ρ become 
arbitrarily close to zero as the number of firms (n) increases. 
Lemma 1 implies that the simplifying assumption of symmetrically correlated 
stochastic shocks to the abatement costs precludes a negative covariance between the firms’ 
abatement costs ηi and the permit price p. This is seen easily from the covariance between ηi 
and p, which is derived from equation (6) and given by 211 ))1(1(),cov( ηγγ σρη −+= + np tradtradni . It 
is strictly increasing in the correlation coefficient ρ, and equal to 0 and 21 ηγ
γ σ
trad
trad
+  when 
)1/(1 −−= nρ  and 1=ρ , respectively. In particular, we have 0),cov( =piη  if 0=ρ  and 
∞→n , i.e., if the abatement cost shocks are independently distributed across firms and we 
have a continuum of firms.18 The assumption of homogeneous risk environments across firms 
is relaxed in Subsection 2.3. Finally, we note from equation (6) that 0),cov( 21 >= + εγγ σε tradtradp , 
because a positive shock to the product price ε increases production and, thereby, the 
abatement needed to satisfy the emissions cap. The associated higher marginal abatement 
costs increases the permit price p. 
                                                     
17
 Krysiak (2008) assumes [ ]1,0∈ρ . 
18
 We need ∞→n  when 0=ρ  to achieve 0),cov( =piη  because each firm’s own shock to abatement 
costs ηi affects the permit price, cf. equation (6). This influence becomes infinitesimal as ∞→n . 
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The variances of the firms’ optimal production and abatement levels under tradable 
emissions permits are derived from equations (7) and (8) (see the Appendix): 
( ) ( )( ) ,11
1
var
2
2
2




−++



+
= ρσσ
γ
γ η
ε n
n
q
trad
trad
trad  
(11) 
( ) ( ) ,)1(1var 22212 εη σσργ Kn
n
K
a tradtrad +


−+−=  (12) 
with 02
43
)1(
2
1 >≡ +
+
trad
tradtradK γ
γγ
 and ( ) 0212 >≡ + tradtradK γγ . The variances are equal across all firms Ni ∈ . 
Moreover, the variance in the optimal abatement under tradable emissions permits is strictly 
decreasing in ρ and satisfies [ ]2222222 ),()var( ηεηε σγσσσ tradtrad KKa ++∈ , because the 
correlation coefficient between the firms’ abatement costs satisfies [ ]1),1/(1 −−∈ nρ . In 
particular, 0)var( >trada  even if 1=ρ  and 02 =εσ . This is true because abatement costs 
affect production, and thereby the level of aggregate abatement needed to satisfy the 
emissions cap. 
 
2.1.2 Emissions tax 
The government sets a tax on emissions that we denote τ under price-based regulation. 
This is set to induce equal expected aggregate emissions under the two regulatory regimes. 
Thus, the tax solves )(
, ∈−= Ni taxitax anqES . Using the first-order conditions (3) and (4), 
this implies: 
.
1
1 2 


+−
+
= tax
tax n
SD γ
γ
τ  (13) 
Note that the tax is equal to the expected value of the permit price (6) if the technology 
parameters (γ) are equal under the two regulatory regimes. The fixed tax contrasts with the 
stochastic permit price. This simply reflects that price-based regulation features a fixed price 
and endogenous quantities, while the opposite applies to tradable quantity regulation. 
The first-order conditions (3) and (4) and the tax given by equation (13) yields: 
,
1 



−+
+
+= tax
taxtax
tax
tax
n
SDq γ
γγ
γ
ε  (14) 
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,
1, taxitaxtax
tax
taxi
n
SDa γηγ
γ
γ
−


−−
+
=  (15) 
for all firms Ni ∈ . We first observe from equation (14) that the firm’s production level is 
independent of the stochastic element to abatement costs ηi under an emissions tax. This 
reflects our assumption of separability between abatement costs and other production costs, 
and that the marginal cost of emissions is constant and equal to the tax in equilibrium. This 
leaves the total costs of production independent of the abatement cost shock ηi. Furthermore, 
the two elements that constitute the stochastic exogenous price for the good produced, ε+D , 
affect optimal production in different ways, because the regulator sets the tax based on 
expected values, and 0)( =εE , while D is an exogenous constant. Proceeding to abatement, 
we note from equation (15) that the firm’s optimal abatement level is independent of the 
product price shock ε under price-based regulation. The reason is that firms simply abate until 
marginal abatement costs are equal to the tax, leaving aggregate emissions endogenous under 
price-based regulation. 
Equations (14) and (15) yield the equilibrium emissions itaxnStaxitax aq ηγε ++=− ,  for 
any firm Ni ∈ . Note that aggregate emissions are equal to  ∈++ Ni itaxnS ηγε , with an 
expected value equal to the emissions cap under tradable emissions permits S. 
Finally, we derive the expectations and variances in optimal production and abatement 
from equations (14) and (15): 
( ) ,
1 



−+
+
= tax
taxtax
tax
tax
n
SDqE γ
γγ
γ
 
(16) 
( ) ,
1



−−
+
= tax
tax
tax
tax
n
SDaE γ
γ
γ
 
(17) 
( ) ,var 2εσ=taxq  (18) 
( ) ,22 taxtaxaVar γση=  (19) 
which are equal across all firms Ni ∈ . 
 
2.1.3 Comparison of the regimes 
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Based on the previous analysis, we state the following result regarding the first- and 
second-order moments in the probability distributions of optimal abatement and production 
under the two regulatory regimes: 
 
Proposition 1. Assume that the two regulatory instruments are designed to induce equal 
expected aggregate emissions and let the firms’ profit maximization problem be given by 
equation (2). Then we have the following: 
 
i. )()( taxtrad qEqE =  if and only if tradtax γγ = . We have )()( taxtrad qEqE ≠  otherwise. 
ii. )var()()var( taxtrad qq ≤≥  if and only if 22 ))1(1()( 3 ηε σρσ −+≥≤ nnK , with 
0213
2
>≡ + trad
tradK γ
γ
. 
iii. )var()()var( taxtrad aa ≤≥  if and only if 2522 ))1(1()( 4 ηηε σσρσ KnnK +−+≤≥ , with 
02 24 >+≡ tradtradK γγ  and )( 22)1(5 2
2
tradtax
trad
tradK γγγ
γ
−≡
+
. 
Proof. The Proposition is obtained from equations (9) to (12) and (16) to (19). 
 
Interpreting part (i), each firm has equal expected emissions across the regimes, i.e., 
)()( tradtradtaxtax aqEaqE −=− . This is not surprising, as we have assumed equal aggregate 
expected emissions across the regulatory instruments. However, the expected values of 
optimal production (and thereby abatement) are equal across the regimes if and only if the 
firms technology choices satisfy tradtax γγ = . This happens because the regulator has only one 
instrument available for each regulatory regime (i.e., the emissions cap S or the tax τ), while 
the firms have three decision variables. That is, if the regulatory instruments are used to 
impose equal expected aggregate emissions across the regimes, the regulator cannot ensure 
equal expected production levels. Therefore, although tradable emissions permits and a tax 
may be equivalent with respect to expected aggregate emissions, the regulatory regimes will 
in general have different effects on the product market when the abatement cost structure is 
endogenous. Note that the regulator could alternatively calibrate its instruments in order to 
induce equal expected aggregate production across the regulatory regimes. 
Interpreting part (ii), we emphasize two opposing mechanisms that are present under 
tradable emissions permits, but not under an emissions tax. On the one hand, a positive shock 
to the price of the good produced ε increases production and thereby aggregate emissions. 
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Because there is a cap on aggregate emissions under tradable emissions permits, this implies 
more aggregate abatement and, hence, a higher permit price (cf. equation 6). This increases 
total production costs and thereby reduces the firms’ response to the product price shock ε. 
The mechanism is absent under price-based regulation, because the emissions tax is constant. 
This explains why a higher variance in the price of the good produced 2εσ  tends to decrease 
the variance in production under tradable emissions permits )var( tradq  as compared with the 
variance in production under a tax )var( taxq . On the other hand, )var( tradq  tends to increase in 
ρ, i.e., in the correlation coefficient across the shocks to the firms’ abatement costs ηi, and in 
the variance in the abatement cost shocks 2ησ . The reason is that the variance in the permit 
price (6), and thereby total production costs, increases in these two variables. In particular, 
)var( tradq  remains positive even if we impose the extra restrictions that 0≡iη  and 0≡ε , 
given that )0,0(~ 2 >ηση j  for any other firm {}iNj \∈  and )1/(1 −−> nρ  (cf. equation 
11). Again, this does not happen under an emissions tax, where the price on emissions is 
constant. 
Interpreting part (iii) of Proposition 1, we again emphasize two opposing mechanisms. 
Firstly, a larger 2εσ  tends to increase the variance in abatement under tradable emissions 
permits )var( trada , but does not affect the variance under a tax )var( taxa  (cf. equations 12 and 
19). The reason is that fluctuations in aggregate emissions (caused by fluctuations in 
production) must be mirrored by aggregate abatement in order to satisfy the emissions cap 
under tradable emissions permits. Naturally, this does not occur in a tax regime where 
aggregate emissions are endogenous. Secondly, a high (low) equilibrium permit price tends to 
occur together with high (low) realized abatement costs, given )1/(1 −−> nρ . This reduces 
the effect 2ησ  has on )var( trada . Finally, we observe that 05 =K  if and only if taxtrad γγ = . 
The effects discussed in the two preceding paragraphs are summarized in Table 1 for 
convenience. On the one hand, both ε and ηi affect the optimal levels of production and 
abatement under tradable emissions permits. In contrast, optimal production and abatement 
under price-based regulation are only affected by one shock each, i.e., ε and ηi, respectively. 
On the other hand, the equilibrium permit price tends to reduce the effect of ηi on abatement 
and ε on production. Whether the variances are larger under price- or quantity-based 
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regulation depends on the relative strengths of these mechanisms, as captured by the 
conditions on technology and the stochastic elements in Proposition 1. 
Finally, we note that there is no reason to expect the firms to increase their profits if 
the variances in production or abatement decrease, even though larger variances in production 
and abatement tend to increase production and abatement costs.19 Why is this? Note that the 
firm could always choose to keep abatement and production constant, even though prices or 
costs differ from their expected values. This strategy would yield the firm’s profits as a linear 
and increasing function of )( ηε +−+ wD . However, we know that the profit-maximizing 
firm does not follow this strategy (cf. equations 3 and 4). This is because it can do better by 
changing its production and abatement levels, which implies that profits (2) are convex in 
)( ηε +−+ wD .20 We also observe from the first-order condition (4) that a higher γ induces a 
stronger response in optimal abatement for any given change in )( ηε +−+ wD . This simply 
reflects the value of flexibility discussed in the Introduction. 
 
2.2 Period 2: The investment decision 
The impetus of our analysis of the firms’ investment decisions in period 2 is that their 
abatement technology choice depends on the extent of anticipated future fluctuations in 
abatement. More specifically, the firms’ choices between abatement cost structures represent 
a trade-off between static efficiency and flexibility (as illustrated in Figure 1). Intuition 
suggests that the relative weight on flexibility in this trade-off increases if uncertainty 
regarding the future abatement level is large. For example, if the equilibrium permit price 
turns out to be unexpectedly high in period 3, a firm may reduce its costs with a higher level 
of abatement. The firm can increase its adaptability to such future events in period 3 by 
investing in a more flexible technology in period 2. 
In period 2, any firm Ni ∈  maximizes expected profits with respect to abatement cost 
structure as determined by γ: 
[ ] [ ] ,max, iEHL πγ ΓΓ∈  (20) 
                                                     
19
 On the other hand, a smoother consumption path over time increases the consumers’ utility, given that the 
utility function is concave in consumption of the good q. 
20
 The increase in profits because of higher price variability was first noted by Oi (1961). In particular, this 
implies that minimum average abatement costs are higher than the permit price in competitive equilibrium 
with zero profits, free entry/exit and a fluctuating permit price. 
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with iπ  given by equation (2). The competitive firm’s influence on the market-
clearing permit price p is infinitesimal and ignored under tradable emissions permits. The 
emissions tax τ is a constant fixed by the regulator. Hence, { }τ,pw∈  is a constant in the 
maximization problem above. 
The interior solution to the maximization problem (20) is characterized by the 
following first-order condition (see the Appendix): 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,var
2
1
2
1
2
2
2 aaEaEF γγγ
=−+  (21) 
with expectations )(aE  and variances )var(a  as given by equations (10) and (12) 
under tradable emissions permits and (17) and (19) under an emissions tax. Note that all 
elements in equation (21) are equal across the regulatory regimes, except the decision variable 
γ and )var(a . We show in the proof of Proposition 2 below that the first- and second-order 
conditions of the maximization problem (20) imply that 0)var(/ >∂∂ aγ  in the interior 
solution. This implies that a larger )var(a  increases the expected gain from flexibility. 
Flexibility is not a free good, however. The expected unit cost of abatement increases in 
flexibility at the abatement level that induces minimum average abatement costs. As such, 
equation (21) gives the solution to the firm’s trade-off between static efficiency and 
flexibility. The firm is willing to increase abatement costs at an abatement level ai close to 
minimum average cost in order to reduce its costs when ai is further away from this level. The 
greater the variance in ai, the greater is the cost the firm is willing to accept to increase its 
ability to accommodate such future events.21 
For values of our exogenous variables where the maximization problem (20) has no 
interior solution, the following rule applies: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,,var
2
1
2
1
2
2
2 γγγ
γ γ ∀>−+Γ= aaEaEFifL  (22) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) .,var
2
1
2
1
2
2
2 γγγ
γ γ ∀<−+Γ= aaEaEFifH  (23) 
Therefore, the firm will choose the lowest possible level of flexibility if the cost of 
flexibility is very high, or, alternatively, if the gain from flexibility represented by )var(a  is 
low (cf. equation 22). In particular, we get this border solution if the variance in abatement, as 
                                                     
21
 Note the analogy to the lower expected utility a risk-averse agent is willing to accept in order to increase 
utility if the outcome of the risk is bad. 
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given by equations (12) or (19), is zero, in which case the firm would choose the technology 
that yields the lowest possible minimum average abatement costs. In contrast, if the cost of 
flexibility is low, the firm may choose the highest possible level of flexibility (cf. equation 
23). 
In the introduction to this paper, we outlined the following research question: does 
environmental regulation have a risk-related technology choice effect in addition to the effects 
on cost efficiency and investment levels? We state the following result: 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that the two regulatory instruments are designed to induce equal 
expected aggregate emissions and let the firms’ profit maximization problem be given by 
equation (20). Then we have tradtrad γγ )(≤≥  if and only if )var()()var( taxtrad aa ≤≥ . 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Strict inequalities in the condition on the variances yield strict inequalities between the 
flexibility parameters γ in the two regimes (with at least one interior solution for γ). Note that 
the condition for )var()()var( taxtrad aa ≤≥  is given in part (iii) of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 establishes that the intuition stated in the beginning of this section is 
indeed correct: the firms’ choice between abatement cost functions represents a trade-off 
between static efficiency and flexibility. In this trade-off, firms are willing to sacrifice more 
static efficiency in order to gain a flexible technology if the variance in abatement is inflated 
and vice versa. 
Proposition 2 has two important consequences. First, the two regulatory instruments 
lead to implementation of different technologies unless the variances satisfy 
)var()var( taxtrad aa = . The unequal choices of technology follow from the different economic 
environments with regard to risk caused by the two regulatory regimes (the regimes are equal 
when 022 == ηε σσ ).22 This implication corroborates a point emphasized by Krysiak (2008): 
the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a lock-in effect. That is, a switch 
between price- and quantity-based regulations could render existing technology suboptimal 
and, therefore, devalue the installed equipment and the acquired technological knowledge. If 
                                                     
22
 Krysiak (2008) states that different technology choices must occur because the regulator has only one 
instrument, while the firms have two technology choice variables (in his model). However, Proposition 2 
shows that this is not a necessary condition to achieve this result. Indeed, what matters is that the regulator has 
already used its instrument to achieve equal expected aggregate emissions (or, as in Krysiak (2008), equal 
expected marginal production costs). 
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the resultant loss of sunk technology investment costs is substantial, it may deter a change of 
regulatory instrument once it has been implemented. Second, Proposition 2 states that both 
types of regulation may induce stronger incentives to choose the most flexible technology 
(remember the ambiguity stated in Proposition 1, point iii). 
Propositions 1 and 2 have the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1. Assume that the two regulatory instruments are designed to induce equal 
expected aggregate emissions and let the firms’ profit maximization problem be given by 
equation (20). Then we have the following: 
i. )()( taxtrad qEqE = 2522 ))1(1(4 ηηε σσρσ KnnK +−+=⇔ . Otherwise, )()( taxtrad qEqE ≠ . 
ii. taxtrad γγ )(≤≥ 2522 ))1(1()( 4 ηηε σσρσ KnnK +−+≤≥⇔ . 
iii. If 00 22 >∩= ηε σσ , then taxtrad γγ )(=<  if and only if )1/(1)( −−=> nρ . The 
technology choices become arbitrarily close to identical as n increases if 0=ρ . 
iv. If 00 22 =∩> ηε σσ , then taxtrad γγ > . 
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. 
 
Parts (i) and (ii) in the corollary simply merge the results obtained previously in 
Propositions 1 and 2 (remember that K4 and K5 are defined in Proposition 1, part iii). Their 
interpretations are not repeated here. 
Interpreting part (iii) in Corollary 1, the variance in abatement is less under tradable 
emissions permits as long as the correlation coefficient between the shocks to the firms’ 
abatement cost functions satisfies )1/(1 −−> nρ  and the product price is deterministic (i.e., 
02 =εσ ). The regimes become equal if ρ reaches its lower bound )1/(1 −−= nρ . Note that 
we require negative correlation in order to induce equal technology across the regulatory 
regimes (for a bounded number of firms n). This is because the realized abatement cost of any 
firm Ni∈  itself influences the permit price under tradable emissions permits. The reader may 
have observed that part (iii) of Corollary 1 omits that Propositions 1 and 2 imply taxtrad γγ >  if 
)1/(1 −−< nρ  when 022 => εη σσ . This is because Lemma 1 states that )1/(1 −−≥ nρ  when 
)( jiE ηη  is equal for all Nji ∈,  ( ji ≠ ). Hence, it is impossible to have values of ρ  that 
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induce taxtrad γγ >  in this case. The assumption of homogeneous risk environments across 
firms is relaxed in Subsection 2.3. 
We last observe that the regimes yield the same technology if 0=ρ , ∞→n  and 
02 =εσ . This is true because the probability distribution of the market-clearing permit price 
(6) then collapses around its expected value (by the law of large numbers), which becomes 
equal to the emissions tax. That is, the characteristics of tradable emissions permits converge 
toward those of price-based regulation as n increases when the ηs are independent across 
firms )0( =ρ  and 02 =εσ . Part (iii) of Corollary 1 is related closely to Krysiak (2008), which 
assumes that unexpected shocks may only occur to the firms’ supply costs. This translates to 
0≡ε  in our model. In this particular case, our model reproduces the result on technology 
choice in Krysiak (2008). 
Part (iv) of Corollary 1 is true because 0)( =taxaVar  while 0)( >tradaVar  under the 
given assumptions (cf. equations 12 and 19). Intuitively, there is no source of uncertainty in 
optimal abatement under an emissions tax: both abatement costs and the tax (τ) are known 
with certainty. The same is not true under tradable emissions permits, where the equilibrium 
permit price is stochastic. Therefore, the corollary implies that firms’ abatement decisions 
under an emissions tax are unaffected by a change in the price of the good of which emissions 
are a by-product. As such, tax-based regulation transfers risk from the firms to the regulator, 
who supposedly cares about the overall level of emissions (given the regulation).23 This latter 
result relies on our assumption that abatement costs are separable from other costs of 
production. 
 
2.3 Two types of firms 
In this extension we relax the assumption of homogeneous risk environments across 
firms. Let there be two types of firms: the “i-firms” consisting of α,...,2,1=i , and the “j-
firms” consisting of nj ,...,2,1 ++= αα . The abatement costs of these firms are hit by the 
stochastic shocks αηηηη ===≡ ...21i  and nj ηηηη αα ===≡ ++ ...21 . Otherwise, the firms 
are identical in all respects. Both iη  and jη  are random variables with expectation and 
variance equal to zero and 2ησ , respectively. We have [ ]1,1/)( 2 −∈≡ ησηηρ jiE . We further 
                                                     
23
 Of course, the firms still have to pay the tax for their higher emissions. 
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limit the analysis to the case where n is a very large number and set 0/ ≈nα . The focus is on 
the i-firms, which have an infinitesimal effect on the equilibrium permit price under tradable 
emissions permits. One possible interpretation of this scenario is that we analyze the 
investment decisions in a sector that only constitutes a small part of an emissions trading 
scheme covering several other sectors. We set 0≡ε  for simplicity (we already know from the 
previous analysis that 02 >εσ  increases the relative flexibility under tradable emissions 
permits). 
The analysis of an emissions tax remains unaltered. Under tradable emissions permits, 
the first-order conditions (3) and (4) remain valid, while the emissions trading market 
equilibrium condition (5) is replaced with ))(()( jjii aqnaqS −−+−= αα . This leaves us 
with 12 +n  equations and 12 +n  unknowns in period 3. The solution of this linear system of 
equations and the firms’ technology investment decisions are left to the proof of Proposition 3 
in the Appendix. We note, however, that the j-firms’ actions under tradable quantities are 
identical to the previous analysis, setting 1=ρ  and 02 =εσ . We state the following result 
regarding the i-firms’ investment decision: 
 
Proposition 3. Assume that the equilibrium permit price is a stochastic variable of which the 
firms in question have infinitesimal influence. Moreover, let the two regulatory instruments be 
designed to induce equal expected aggregate emissions and let the firms’ profit maximization 
problem be given by equation (20). Then we have: 
⇔≤≥∩≤≥ )var()()var()(
,, taxtraditaxtradi aaγγ
( )( )
( )jji
jitaxijj
γγγ
γγγγγγ
ρ
+
+−++
≥≤
1
12
2
1)( 2
3222
. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Note that the condition would simplify to 
j
j
γ
γρ +≥≤ 121)(  if we imposed taxi γγ =  
(applied to the variances only). This is equivalent to the requirement that the correlation 
coefficient between p and ηi satisfies 21)(),( ≥≤ipcorr η .24 Thus, if the equilibrium permit 
price is a stochastic variable over which the firms in question have infinitesimal influence, the 
variance in the firms abatement level will be larger (smaller) under emissions trading if and 
                                                     
24
 The correlation coefficient is derived from the expression for the permit price in the proof of Proposition 3. 
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only if the correlation coefficient between the shocks to the firms abatement costs and the 
permit price is smaller (larger) than 1/2 (for a given technology taxi γγ = ). 
Proposition 3 shows that some firms may invest in the most flexible technology under 
tradable emissions permits, even though the correlation between the shocks that occur to the 
firms’ abatement costs is positive and 0≡ε . The variance in the j-firms’ abatement is less 
than that of the i-firms and, indeed, less than it would be under an emissions tax. Therefore, 
they choose a less flexible technology than they would under a tax (cf. part (iii) of Corollary 
1, with 1=ρ  and 02 =εσ ). 
Therefore, the firms’ choices of technology may differ under tradable emissions 
permits when we relax the assumption of homogeneous risk across firms. This is not 
surprising, as firms no longer have the same variance in abatement. It contrasts with an 
emissions tax, where all firms still invest in the same technology. Independent (or weakly 
correlated) ηs may be reasonable if much of the noise in abatement costs stems from random 
events such as breakdown of infrastructure or abatement equipment.25 
 
3 Conclusion 
This paper examined whether environmental regulation has a risk-related technology 
choice effect in addition to the well-known effects on cost efficiency and investment levels. In 
order to answer this question, we first examined the first- and second-order moments in the 
probability distributions of optimal abatement and optimal production under price- and 
quantity-based regulation. Then, we used the regulatory regime-dependent (random) payoffs 
to derive the technology choice of the forward-looking firms. Besides determining which of 
the existing technologies is implemented, we emphasize that the firms’ technology choice 
may also influence the direction of R&D efforts. This occurs through the demand for 
advanced abatement technology (e.g., see Griliches, 1957 or Ruttan, 2001). 
Regarding the first-order moments, we found that the two regulatory instruments in 
general lead to different expected aggregate production levels when technology choice is 
endogenous, given that regulation is designed to induce equal expected aggregate emissions. 
                                                     
25
 Parson et al. (2009) states that a disruption in delivery of low-sulfur coal because of track failures in October 
2005 created a bottleneck that reduced deliveries significantly. In addition, a pair of coal mines had extended 
outages. The price of low-sulfur coal trading in the Midwest peaked in December 2005 at a level triple the 
price a year earlier. The shortage in low-sulfur coal forced 11 power companies to shift to higher-sulfur coal 
with attendant higher SO2 emissions. 
 23 
The result, although not surprising, as the regulator only has one instrument (i.e., a tax or an 
emissions cap), emphasizes that price- and quantity-based regulation will have different 
effects on the product market. Regarding the second-order moments, we found that either 
regulatory regime may induce the larger variance in optimal production and optimal 
abatement levels. This is true because the regimes induce different economic environments 
with regard to risk. In short, both uncertainty regarding the price for the good produced 
(production of which causes emissions as a byproduct) and uncertainty about the abatement 
costs affect the optimal levels of production and abatement under tradable emissions permits. 
In contrast, optimal production and abatement under an emissions tax are only affected by one 
shock, i.e., product price uncertainty and abatement cost uncertainty, respectively. On the 
other hand, the equilibrium permit price tends to reduce the effect of abatement cost 
uncertainty
 
on abatement, and of product price uncertainty on production. Whether the 
variances are larger under price- or quantity-based regulation depends on the relative 
strengths of these mechanisms. 
We then showed that firms accommodate the different risk environments by 
implementing different types of technology. The intuition behind our result on technology 
choice is straightforward. First, both regulatory regimes may cause the highest variance in 
abatement. Second, the firms’ valuation of a flexible technology increases if the variance in 
optimal abatement is inflated. Therefore, the firms may choose the most flexible abatement 
technology under either regulatory regime, depending on the characteristics of the stochastic 
elements. Finally, we showed that tradable emissions permits induce heterogeneous 
technology investments if we allow the risk environment to differ across firms. This result 
stems from the attendant dissimilar variances in the firms’ abatement levels. The firms always 
implement the same technology under an emissions tax, given the assumptions of this paper. 
It may be tempting to argue that, because flexibility comes at the cost of static 
efficiency, one type of regulation is better than the other. There are, however, at least two 
reasons for not doing this. Firstly, we found that an emissions tax may move the risk caused 
by product price uncertainty from the firms to the regulator.26 That is, a less risky 
environment for the firms does not necessarily imply less overall risk in a welfare analysis. 
Secondly, a flexible technology is very likely to reduce the costs of altered policy targets 
(e.g., because of new information on damages from greenhouse gas emissions). This is 
                                                     
26
 Given that the regulator cares about the emissions level and not the firms’ cost of abatement (or tax revenue). 
See, e.g., Weitzman (1974) for a discussion of the short-run properties of price- and quantity-based regulation 
under uncertainty. 
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relevant, as we have examined the long-run cost functions of the firms (allowing for 
technology investments). 
The analysis features some assumptions that should be commented on. First, we have 
examined the case where the regulator faces a given target for aggregate emissions. This 
could, for example, reflect a country that must fulfill its part of some international climate 
change treaty. Alternatively, it could depict a case with insufficient knowledge on 
environmental costs or industry benefits of emissions, rendering classical optimal policy such 
as a Pigovian tax infeasible. Note that optimal policy (that equalizes marginal expected 
environmental damage and marginal expected abatement costs) would typically involve 
different expected aggregate emissions levels under tradable emissions permits and a tax, 
given that the regimes in general induce different technologies. Second, our representation of 
technology is very stylized and adopted to get tractable analytical results. However, as our 
analysis indicates ambiguity in the case with quadratic cost functions, this obviously implies 
that there is ambiguity in the general case too. Regarding our assumption of one probability 
distribution for ηi, equal for all γs, we note that a primary motivation for technology 
investment could be to reduce uncertainty related to future costs. To alleviate this we would 
have to let 2ησ  be a function of γ, which would complicate the analysis. Furthermore, we 
assumed divisibility between abatement costs and other production costs. Without this 
assumption, we would have additional spillover effects under both regulatory approaches 
(featuring cross derivatives between the elements a and q in the cost function). Third, we have 
assumed an exogenous number of firms, but the exit and entry of firms are known to 
influence the ranking of regulatory instruments (see Spulber (1985)). Moreover, Mills (1984) 
shows that competitive equilibrium with free entry and exit may sustain a higher number of 
firms if demand fluctuates than if demand is stationary at its expected value. Although the 
analysis of Mills (1984) does not feature regulation, similar mechanisms may have emerged if 
we relaxed the assumption of a given number of firms. This would affect the conditions on 
the stochastic elements in our results. 
Related to the previous literature, our results have much in common with Mills (1984), 
who shows that an unregulated competitive firm will invest more in a flexible production 
technology if demand uncertainty related to the good produced increases. Moreover, as our 
theoretic framework differs from that of Krysiak (2008), our results corroborate Krysiak’s 
result that regulation has a technology choice effect in addition to the well-known effects on 
cost efficiency and investment levels. However, our findings indicate that this effect is not as 
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clear-cut as stated by Krysiak (2008). That is, both price- and quantity-based regulation may 
induce the most flexible technology, and the ranking depends on the nature of the uncertainty 
faced by the firms. 
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Appendix 
 
Because there is no danger of misinterpretation we omit the regime specific subscripts “trad” 
and “tax” in this appendix (to simplify notation). 
 
The expected minimum average abatement cost of (1) increases in γ: The expected 
marginal cost is given by 1−+ γγ ai , while average cost is γγγ 2//)( aaF i ++ . Hence, 
minimum expected average cost is given by )(22//)(1 γγγγγγγ FaaaFa =⇔++=+ − . 
Inserting in equation (1) we get )(2)(2),)(2( γγγγγγγ FFFac +== , which increases in 
γ. 
 
Proof that a valid covariance matrix is achieved if and only if [ ]1),1/(1 −−∈ nρ : A matrix 
is a valid covariance matrix if and only if it is positive semi-definite. With m identical firms 
the covariance matrix takes the form of the following mm×  matrix: 
.
1
1
1
2














ρρ
ρρ
ρρ
ση  
The determinant of this matrix is given by ))1(1()1( 1 −+− − mm ρρ . It can be shown that the 
principal minors of our nn ×  covariance matrix satisfy the criteria necessary for positive 
semi-definiteness if and only if [ ]1),1/(1 −−∈ nρ  (use the determinant criteria for positive 
semi-definiteness with the given formula for nmmm === ,...,2,1 ). 
 
Derivation of equation (11): Equation (7) yields: 
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which is equation (11). We use 0)( =iE εη  and )(2 jiE ηηρση ≡ . 
 
Derivation of equation (12): Equation (8) yields: 
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Inserting into equation (24) yields equation (12). 
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Derivation of equation (21) and proof of Proposition 2: The maximization problem (20) is 
given by: 
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where the solution to the inner problem is given by equations (7) and (8) under tradable 
emissions permits, and (14) and (15) under an emissions tax. We henceforth denote the 
optimal levels of production and abatement *q  and *ia  ( Ni∈∀ ) under both regulatory 
regimes. Inserting, we get: 
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with the following ni ,...2,1=  first-order conditions: 
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which is equivalent to equation (21). We use the envelope theorem to derive the second 
equality (i.e., the two sets of inner parentheses on the left are equal to zero by the first-order 
conditions 3 and 4). Furthermore, we utilize that 2*
2
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2
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2
1 ))(()var())(( 222 aEaaE γγγ +=  in 
the derivation of the third equality. 
The second-order condition is given by: 
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Note that this implies ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )*
2
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γγγγγ >−+ , which establishes that γ 
increases in var(a). Proposition 2 follows directly. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The first-order conditions (3) and (4) remain valid, while the 
emissions trading market equilibrium condition (5) is replaced with: 
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where we used 0/ ≈nα . Inserting for a and q from equations (3) and (4) with 0=ε  we get: 
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Therefore, the j-firms’ actions under tradable quantities are identical to the previous analysis, 
setting 1=ρ  and 02 =εσ . Concerning the i-firms, we have: 
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Comparison with equation (19) yields that: 
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The proposition then follows from equation (21) and the second-order condition to the 
maximization problem (20). 
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Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Minimum average cost and the slope of the marginal abatement cost function vary inversely with 
flexibility (AC and MC denote average cost and marginal cost, respectively). Note that the assumption in the 
present analysis of quadratic abatement costs yields linear MC curves. 
 
 qtax atax qtrad atrad 
ε ++ 0 + + 
η 0 -- - - 
Table 1. Effects of stochastic variables on optimal production and abatement (two signs denote a stronger effect 
than one sign). 
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